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RECENT DECISIONS
STATE SUCCESSION-CONVENTION ON STATUS OF REFUGEES-
LESOTHO'S USE OF NYERERE LETTER RECOGNIZED TO EFFECT
ACCESSION TO MULTILATERAL CONVENTION BUT REFUGEE DEFINITION
PRECLUDES APPLICABILITY OF CONVENTION.
In 1961 petitioner fled the Republic of South Africa to Basutoland, then a
British colony, to escape criminal charges in a South African court.' In October
1966 Basutoland became the independent Kingdom of Lesotho, a member of
the British Commonwealth.' Under provisions of the law of Lesotho,3 appli-
cant was ordered' to leave the country in August 1968.1 However, the applicant,
contesting the order in court, contended that he was a refugee, as defined in
the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees; 6 that Lesotho had acceded
'in August 1961 Mr. Joseph Molefi was arrested and charged before the Regional Court of
Johannesburg with being a member of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and committing unlaw-
ful acts. On August 28, 1961, he was released on bail, to reappear in court on October 26. Prior
to October 26, he chose as a haven, Maseru, capital of Basutoland, then a British colony, sur-
rounded by the Republic of South Africa.
In 1958 the PAC was formed from the more militant faction of the African Nationalist Congress
(ANC), founded in 1912, one of the earliest African nationalist organizations. On March 21, 1960.
the PAC conducted public demonstrations throughout the Republic to protest government restric-
tions on passes. In Sharpeville a large gathering of Africans were fired upon by police, killing 69.
In response the ANC and the PAC called for a day of mourning on March 28. Most African
workers in the large cities stayed away from work; a serious disruption of commerce and industry
resulted. The government retaliated by banning public gatherings and enacting the Unlawful
Organizations Act authorizing the executive to ban the ANC and the PAC. Both were officially
declared illegal by Proclamation No. 119 on April 8, 1960. Regarding the PAC and the Unlawful
Organization Act, see A. HEPPLE, SOUTH AFRICA 164-65 (1966).
Specifically, Molefi was charged with being a member of an organization declared unlawful
under the Unlawful Organizations Act, No. 34 of 1960, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: I I
SOUTH AFRICA 711 (on original publication), as last amended, General Law Amendment Act, No.
37 of 1963, GENERAL LAW AMENDMENT ACTS: §§ 14-16, 5 SOUTH AFRICA 221 (on original publica-
tion), which extended the executory parts of the Suppression of Communism Act to the PAC.
2Lesotho Independence Act 1966, c. 24.
'Aliens Control Act, No. 16 of 1966, § 25 (Lesotho).
'During August the Prime Minister of Lesotho ordered all refugees out of the country. He
charged that a number of the South African refugees were meddling in the internal affairs of the
country in spite of repeated warnings. S. AFR. INST. OF RACE RELATIONS, [1970] A SURVEY OF
RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 73 (January 1971).
5Although the Aliens Control Act of 1966 was enacted by the Basutoland Parliament and
assented to on September 30, 1966, it was designed to come into operation on a date to be fixed.
It became operative on March I, 1968.
'in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed at Geneva, on 28 July 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150, the term "refugee" is designated to apply to any person who:
.(2) As a result of events occuring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
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to the Convention; 7 and that, consequently, under Lesotho law, he should be
allowed to remain.' In accordance with Lesotho law,' he presented his petition
to the High Court of Lesotho which dismissed it,10 holding that Lesotho had
not acceded to the Convention. Even though not required, the Court also
decided that the applicant was not a refugee within the definition of the Con-
vention." The High Court decision was upheld by the Lesotho Court of Ap-
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it. (emphasis added).
Id. at 152, ch. I, art. I, § A(2).
'The United Kingdom ratified and later extended the Convention to Basutoland, effective Febru-
ary 9, 1961, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The plaintiff
contended that Lesotho acceded to the Convention when on March 22, 1967 the Prime Minister
of Lesotho wrote a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, concerning Lesotho's
treaty obligations. On the subject of multilateral treaties, the Prime Minister declared that:
. . .ITihe Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho proposes to review each of them
individually and to indicate to the depositary in each case what steps it wishes to take
in relation to each such instrument-whether by way of confirmation of termination,
confirmation of succession or accession. During such interim period of review, any party
to a multilateral treaty which has, prior to independence, been applied or extended to
the country formerly known as Basutoland, may, on a basis of reciprocity, rely as against
Lesotho on the terms of such treaty.
Letter from Chief Leabua Jonathan, Prime Minister of Lesotho, to U Thant, Secretary-General
of the United Nations, Mar. 22, 1967, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 884-85 (1970). Plaintiff
contended that the letter was an executive act.
'Plaintiff relied on the Aliens Control Act of 1966, § 38 (1):
If any international treaty or convention relating to refugees is or has been acceded to
by or on behalf of the Government of Lesotho, an alien who is a refugee within the
meaning of such a treaty or convention shall not be refused entry into or sojourn in
Lesotho, and shall not be expelled from Lesotho in pursuance of the provisions of this
Act except with his consent or except to the extent that is permitted by that treaty or
convention, subject to any reservation that may be in force at the material time.
'Aliens Control Act, § 38(2):
If any question arises-
(a) whether an alien is a refugee;
(b) whether any provision of an international treaty or convention relating to refugees,
applies to that alien; and
(c) whether the expulsion of that alien from Lesotho is permitted by that treaty or
convention.
The High Court may on the application of that alien declare that he is a refugee, that
that provision of the international treaty or convention applies to him, and may declare
that his expulsion from Lesotho is, or is not, permitted by that treaty or convention, or
may decline to make any such declaration.
"Molefi v. Principal Legal Adviser, 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 581 (Lesotho High Court 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Molefi, (High Court)].
"The High Court of Lesotho held first that Chief Jonathan's letter of March 22, 1967, at most
contained,
[A] promise to accede to or honour a particular treaty if and when the occasion
arises but this promise was subject to the qualification of reciprocity and was further
qualified by the stipulation that only a party to a particular treaty could as against
Lesotho, rely on the terms of such treaty. In my [the Court's] view the letter cannot be
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peal.12 Applicant then petitioned the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun-
cil.' 3 On appeal, held, dismissed. Although the letter of March 1967 from
Lesotho's Prime Minister to the Secretary-General of the United Nations is
found to be a declaration of Lesotho's accession to the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, 1951,11 the Convention does not apply to an alien
applicant seeking relief from criminal prosecution under the South African
Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960, in that the applicant was not outside
South Africa as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951,'15 so as to
be a refugee within the meaning of the Convention." Molefi v. Principal Legal
Adviser, [1971] A.C. 182 (P.C. 1970) (Lesotho), 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 879
interpreted as an instrument or act of general accession to all multilateral treaties and
the Convention in question cannot therefore be regarded as one which has been acceded
to by or on behalf of the Government of Lesotho within the meaning of Section 38 of
the Aliens Control Act.
Id. at 586. Secondly, the court found that his seeking refuge in Maseru was due to only one event
which was "the pending charge against him in South Africa" for being a member of the Pan
Africanist Congress. The only event connected in any way with the charge and which could be said
to have occurred before January 1, 1951 was that "the Act under which the charge was framed
was passed by the Parliament of South Africa in 1950." There was insufficient causal relation
between the applicant's flight and that pre-1951 "event." Id, at 587.
"
2There is no published report of this case. The decision was reached on May 30, 1969. According
to the Times (London), May 31, 1969, at 4, col. 6, the Court of Appeal ordered the appellant to
be taken to South Africa to face the criminal charges awaiting him.
"
3The Judicial Committee has declared that the right to appeal to it was inherent in the law of
the Commonwealth territories outside the United Kingdom unless the respective member's legisla-
ture had abrogated that right. See generally Ibralebbe v. Regina [19641 A.C. 900 (P.C.) (Ceylon).
"The Privy Council decided the question of the significance of the Prime Minister's letter in
contradiction to the High Court opinion (note I I supra). The Privy Council stated:
The Prime Minister's letter was therefore, . . .a declaration that pending individual
examination . . .of those multilateral treaties which had resulted in treaty relations
between the country formerly known as Basutoland and other states, Lesotho would
adhere to those treaties.
Molefi v. Principal Legal Adviser, [1971] A.C. 182, 194 (P.C. 1970) (Lesotho), 9 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'LS 879, 886 [hereinafter cited as Molefi, (P.C.)].
15See note 39 infra.
"
6The court, in denying the applicant refugee status, stated:
In considering the question whether the appellant is outside South Africa as a result of
pre-1951 events one or two facts additional to those already mentioned must be in mind.
The charges preferred against the appellant in 1961 referred to the period between 8th
April 1960 and July 1961. The charges included charges of performing acts calculated
to further some of the objects of "communism" by participation in the affairs of an
unlawful organisation, i.e. the Pan Africanist Congress. That body did not come into
existence until 1959. On 8th April 1960 it was declared to be an unlawful organisation
.... The view of the learned President was that properly regarded "the pre-1951 South
African legislation and the repressive Government policy referred to by the appellant"
were merely the background to later events. On the undisputed facts the appellant
remained in South Africa for some 13 years after the 1948 Elections and for some I I
years after the passing of the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950. The charges
which were formulated in the prosecution proceedings related to 1960 and 1961.
9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS, at 888.
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(1970), affg Lesotho C.A. (not published, 1969), affg 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
581 (Lesotho High Court 1969).
Before a court can uphold the application of an international convention it
must determine that the State involved is in fact a party to the convention; then,
the individual invoking the convention must be found competent to rely on it.
The most controversial of the methods by which a State can become a party
to an international convention is through the succession of a newly independent
State to its predecessor's position in that convention. 7 Essentially three theo-
retical approaches to this aspect of State succession"8 have been asserted. Uni-
versal succession, the classical view, provided that the new State succeeded to
all treaty rights and obligations of its predecessor. This theory was based on
an analogy to succession principles of property law. 9 In the nineteenth century
the negative theory2 or "clean slate" doctrine,2' denying succession to any
treaty obligations, emerged and is followed with limitations22 by some scholars
TFor discussion of this controversy, see J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 144-61 (6th ed. M.
Waldock 1963); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, THE EFFECT OF INDEPENDENCE ON TREATIES
(1965); A. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 589-664 (1961); 2 D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION
IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967); D. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUC-
CESSION (1956); 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 936-1027 (1963); Keith and
O'Connell, State Succession to Treaties in the Commonwealth: Two Replies, 13 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 1441 (1964); Lawford, The Practice Concerning Treaty Succession in the Commonwealth, 5
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1967); Lester, State Succession to Treaties in the Commonwealth, 12 INT'L
& COMP. L. Q. 475 (1963); Mallamud, Comment, Optional Succession to Treaties by Newly
Independent States, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1969); O'Connell, Independence and Succession to
Treaties, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 84 (1962); Udokang, The Succession of New States to Multilateral
Treaties, 9 ALBERTA L. REV. 118 (1971); Udokang, Succession to Treaties in New States, 8 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 123 (1970).
"ilt is important to distinguish State succession from government succession. State succession
involves a total change of sovereign whereby the predecessor State ceases to exist; therefore, the
predecessor's rights and obligations also generally cease. However, since a change of government
does not alter the personality of the State, a successor government is required to fulfill the obliga-
tions undertaken by its predecessor on behalf of the State. J. BRIERLY, supra note 17, at 152-53; 1
J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1906); I D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
365-67, 394-95 (2d ed. 1970); 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 17, at 946-47.
"
9An analogy was drawn between the change of sovereignty and the property rights and obliga-
tions passed on in a deceased's estate. O'Connell comments that this view is now "irreconcilable
with political realities." I D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 367. But see
Ecoffard v. Cie. Air France, 39 1.L.R. 453, 455 (Ct. of Ist Instance of Rabat, Morocco 1964).
Here the court appears to consider Morocco's succession to France's previous treaties "indisputa-
ble." The court states that the signing of an inheritance agreement was not necessary to effect the
succession to the predecessor's treaties. [Universal succession is not yet dead.]
"O'Connell explains that under this approach, because of emphasis on the new State's sover-
eignty, it is treated as having received the new territory without any of its predecessor's commit-
ments. I D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 367.
2". .. [Wihen a state ceases to exist, its treaties generally cease with it." J. BRIERLY, supra note
17, at 153. McNair considered the "view of the United Kingdom" on the treaty succession issue
to be that "... newly established States which do not result from a political dismemberment and
cannot fairly be said to involve political continuity with any predecessor, start with a clean slate
in the matter of treaty obligations ....... A. MCNAIR, supra note 17, at 450.
rlThe "clean slate" doctrine is normally limited in theory by distinguishing between personal
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and nations today.2" Under the "clean slate" approach a new nation relies on
the established treaty law procedure of accession to express its intention regard-
ing certain treaty rights and obligations. Following this accession procedure, a
State which was not a party to the original treaty enters into the existing treaty
assuming all rights and duties as a new party.2 4 Under the succession approach
a new State is deemed to inherit the position of its predecessor as a previously
accepted party to the treaty; therefore, the previous parties to the treaty need
not approve the succession. However, the accession of a new State to an exist-
ing treaty is generally subject to the consent of the previously bound parties.
To the latter practice, however, there are exceptions, particularly in many
modern multilateral conventions which are open to unilateral accession. 25 The
current approach 26 appears to exist somewhere between the "clean slate" and
"universal succession" doctrines, 27 although there is very little consistency in
treaties which are considered contractual and therefore do not pass to the successor and dispositive
treaties which are analogous to easements on land and therefore do pass to the new State. J.
BRIERLY, supra note 17, at 153-54; A. McNAIR, supra note 17, at 450; 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 368; 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 17, at 1007.
2A. P. Lester asserted in 1963 that the "clean slate" doctrine was generally recognized and
adhered to in British practice and by the newly independent, formerly British controlled, States.
Lester, State Succession to Treaties in the Commonwealth, supra note 17, at 479-80. But see note
27 infra.24Oppenheim defines this form of "accession" as "the formal entrance of a third State into an
existing treaty, so that it becomes a party to the treaty with all rights and duties arising therefrom."
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 532 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). McNair adds to the
definition: "By 'third State' he [Oppenheim] clearly means any State (other than the original
contracting parties) to whom it is open to accede to the treaty." A. McNAIR, supra note 17, at
98. See also K. HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 85-87 (1967).
"Article 15 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties indicates in general when accession is
allowed:
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by accession when:
(a) the treaty provides that such consent may be expressed by that State by
means of accession:
(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that such
consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession; or
(c) all parties have subsequently agreed that such consent may be expressed by
that State by means of accession.
Article 83 of the same convention is an example of a modern open-ended accession clause. It states:
The present Convention shall remain open for accession by any State belonging to
any of the categories mentioned in Article 81 [members of U.N., specialized agencies,
parties to Statute of I.C.J., and any other State invited by G.A. of U.N.]. The instru-
ments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27 (1969).
"in the interests of international social and economic stability the current approach appears to
be that successor States are required to satisfy some but not all of their predecessor's obligations.
See I D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 368.
2ln reply to Lester, supra note 23, Keith asserts that "his argument is not supported by recent
practice" and there is "no single answer to the question of state succession treaties." Keith and




The practice within the Commonwealth has developed along several distinct
lines. The older Commonwealth Dominions 29 automatically continued the ef-
fect of Imperial treaties after their change in sovereignty. More recently, the
practice has involved the use of devolution, or inheritance, agreements.3 0
Through such agreements 31 the rights and obligations of its predecessor under
previously existing treaties are accepted by the new State. 2 The most contro-
versial development began, however, with the Irish Free State, the first of the
1441. O'Connell states: "It is evident from the practice that the 'clean slate' theory.., has very
few adherents among the new States themselves." Id. at 1452.
21O'Connell suggests that there is so much inconsistency that it is questionable whether the
practice of the new States significantly indicates "the present state of international law respecting
treaty-succession." I D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 370. But, O'Connell
also suggests that "[cilearly the pressure in the direction of continuity is mounting, and it is possible
to predict that within ten years the picture will be one of virtually complete continuity, achieved
either by declarations of succession or by accessions." 2 D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN
MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 229.
"Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.
-The first use of a devolution agreement in the Commonwealth was with the independence of
Iraq in June, 1930, 132 L.N.T.S. 364, CMD. No. 3797, Art. 8, (1930). Since then (as of January
1970): Jordan, 6 U.N.T.S. 144, CMD. No. 6916 (1946); Burma, 70 U.N.T.S. 184, CMD. No. 7360
(1948); Ceylon, 86 U.N.T.S. 26, CMD. No. 7257 (1948); Malaya, 279 U.N.T.S. 287, CMND. No.
346 (1957); Cyprus, 382 U.N.T.S. 8, CMND. No. 1252 (1960); Nigeria, 384 U.N.T.S. 207, CMND
No. 1214 (1961): Sierra Leone, 420 U.N.T.S. II, CMND No. 1464 (1962); Jamaica, CMND No.
1918; Trinidad and Tobago, CMND No. 1919; Ghana was the first African State to sign a devolu-
tion agreement, 287 U.N.T.S. 233, CMND No. 345 (1958).
3'A typical modern devolution agreement is that of Nigeria, CMND No. 1214 (1961), reprinted
in 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 17, at 1000:
(i) All obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United Kingdom
which arise from any valid international instrument are, from October 1, 1960, assumed
by the Government of the Federation of Nigeria in so far as such instruments may be
held to have application to or in respect of the Federation of Nigeria.
(ii) The rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United
Kingdom in virtue of the application of any such international instrument to or in respect
of the Federation of Nigeria are from October 1, 1960, enjoyed by the Government of
the Federation of Nigeria.
3 2The actual effect of the devolution agreement is controversial. E. Lauterpacht suggests that
the correct interpretation may be to regard it "as an offer by the new State to remain bound, subject
to certain conditions and limitations, by the commitments of its parent." E. Lauterpacht, Note,
State Succession and agreements for the inheritance of treaties, 7 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 524, 529
(1958). McNair considers it as "an attempted novation . . . [which] assumes the consent of the
other parties to those treaties. ... A. MCNAIR, supra note 17, at 650. Lester asserts that the
consent of the other parties is necessary for there to be an assignment of treaty rights. Lester, supra
note 23, at 505. Professor O'Connell in agreement with what he describes as the current approach,
supra note 26, maintains that "the devolution agreements" are confirmatory of a general succes-
sion to treaties under international law, and are intended mainly to put other parties on notice of
the successor State's affirmative policy. 2 D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 (1967). The United States appears to recognize the validity of these
agreements as evidenced by its annual Treaties in force, see 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 17, at
1005. The United Nations also recognizes the agreement as shown by a summary of the practice
of the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties. Id. at 1008.
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newly independent States to assert a right of optional sucoession to treaties.3
A significant further development of the concept of optional succession oc-
curred in 1961. This was the formulation of what is now known as the "Nyerere
Doctrine ' 3 by the Prime Minister (now President) of Tanganyika (now
Tanzania), Julius Nyerere. Nyerere stated that Tanganyika would continue to
apply British treaties for two years after independence, while examining them
respecting future applicability. At the end of the two-year period, all treaties
not confirmed would be deemed to have lapsed.3 1 Since the origination of the
Nyerere Doctrine, a number of new African States,"6 including Lesotho,37
have followed the same approach, thereby establishing the Nyerere Doctrine
as the newest widespread practice regarding membership of a new State in
international conventions. All the above-mentioned methods of State succes-
sion must necessarily be considered before deciding whether a new State is, in
fact, to be declared a party to any international convention in which its prede-
cessor held membership. Once the convention membership question has been
answered, the rights of the individual claiming under the convention may be
decided.
In considering whether an individual may invoke the protection of the Con-
vention on the Status of Refugees, the court must find the individual concerned
to be within the Convention's definition of the term "refugee." The definition
of a refugee under the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees was
intended by its drafters to be liberally construed in favor of the applicant.38
However, the Convention is only applicable literally to the refugee who flees
the country of his residence as a result of events occurring before January 1,
"The Irish Minister of External Affairs stated in 1933 before the Irish Parliament:
When a new State comes into existence, which formerly formed part of an older State,
its acceptance or otherwise of the treaty relationship of the older State is a matter for
the new State to determine by express declaration . . . as considerations of policy may
require.
Reprinted in Mallamud, Comment, Optional Succession to Treaties by Newly Independent States.
supra note 17, at 784.
3 Statement of Julius Nyerere before the Tanganyika National Assembly, November 30, 1961,
reprinted in I I INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1210 (1962).
3The Nyerere letter, reprinted in 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 17, at 1000-1002.
36Uganda, letter reprinted in Int'l L. Ass'n, supra note 17, at 386; Kenya, id. at 387; Malawi,
id. at 388, 389; also Botswana and Lesotho. 2 D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 17, at 116.3 Supra note 7. This letter was practically a verbatim copy of the Nyerere letter, supra note 35.
31As a prologue to the Convention on the Status of Refugees, the Final Act of The United
Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Held at
Geneva from 2 July 1951 to 25 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 138, 148, stated the following:
THE CONFERENCE
Expresses the hope that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees will have value
as an example exceeding its contractual scope and that all nations will be guided by it
in granting so far as possible to persons in their territory as refugees and who would
not be covered by the terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it provides.
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1951 ,3 these events having produced a "well-founded fear" of his being perse-
cuted for various specific reasons. 40 The Convention's draftsmen, realizing the
inherent interpretative problems in the definition's qualifications, tried to
broaden its spectrum with the explication that these "events" referred to "hap-
penings of major importance involving . . . profound political changes, as well
as systematic programmes of persecution . which are after-effects of earlier
changes"4 ' (emphasis added).
After the Convention entered into force in 1954, courts began deciding which
applicants were properly includable within the Convention's definition. "Refu-
39The insertion of a cut-off date in the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees was made
because the drafting committee believed that "it would be difficult for governments to sign a blank
cheque and to undertake obligations towards future refugees, the origin and number of which would
be unknown." Report of the Ist Session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Stateless Persons and
Related Problems, II U.N. ECOSOC, Annex, Agenda Item No. 32, U.N. Doc. E/1618, E/AC.
32/5 at 38 (1950).
The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York, on January 31, 1967, [1968]
4 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 removes the dateline qualification. The
Protocol begins by stating:
The States Parties to the present Protocol,
Considering that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on
28 July 1951 . . . covers only those persons who have become refugees as a result of
events occurring before I January 1951,
Considering that new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention was adopted
and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of the Conven-
tion,
Considering that it is desirable that equal status should be enjoyed by all refugees
covered by the definition in the Convention irrespective of the dateline 1 January 1951,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISION
2. For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term "refugee" shall .... mean any
person within the definition of Article I of the Convention as if the words "As a result
of events occurring before I January 1951 and. and the words "... as a result of
such events," in Article I A were omitted.
One of the reasons the dateline qualification was deleted was due to the increasing number of
refugees which would not be within this qualification. This was particularly true in Africa, where
modern conflicts have created hundreds of thousands of refugees. Weis, The 1967 Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees and Some Questions of the Law of Treaty, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
39, 40 (1967).
As of June 12, 1972, 51 nations had acceded to the Protocol (last being Fiji). Of the African
nations south of the Congo River all but Lesotho and Malawi have acceded to the Protocol,
(Tanzania, The Congo (Kinshasha), Burundi, Zambia, Botswana, and Swaziland).
'"See supra note 6, for the text of the convention section defining "refugee."
44l U.N. ECOSOC, Annex, Agenda Item No. 32, U.N. Doc. E/1618, E/AC. 32/5, at 33
(1950). But cf 4 N. ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES. ITS HIs-
TORY, CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION. A COMMENTARY 45 (1933). Robinson recommends that
"events" be construed as happenings which create conditions under which a group of persons
become victims of racial, religious, national, social, or political persecution, not necessarily relying
only on profound political changes in the government to be within the scope of the Convention.
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gee" status was easily granted to an applicant who fled from his country after
having been confronted there by an adverse, profound political change which
had originated in the country prior to January 1, 1951.42 Although the courts
seemed to apply the Convention strictly, based on a consideration of whether
the refugee fled because of threat of government reprisal against him for some-
thing that he himself did or thought or represented,43 it cannot be said that
courts actually followed a strict interpretation of the terms of the definition.
In fact, the courts did not recognize the necessity of finding a cause and effect
relationship between a pre-1951 "event" and the post-1951 resulting flight. The
majority of individuals fleeing Iron Curtain countries and invoking the protec-
tion of the Convention were found to be within the definition with minimal
consideration of the limiting date." As an illustration of this judicial construc-
tion, in a case involving a refugee fleeing the hostilities of the 1956 Hungarian
Uprising,45 the Court (German) granted refugee status to an individual without
rIThe requirement "events before January 1, 1951" has been held satisfied for most communist
take-overs. See the following cases which appear to indicate this trend: for Albania, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 1959, VG Ansbach, No. 4005 11/58 (Verwaltungsgericht Ansbach); for Bulgaria, Judg-
ment of Nov. 12 1957, BayVerwGH, No. 250 VIII 56; for Republic of China, Judgment of Nov.
25, 1959, VG Anbach, No. 4078-80 11/58; for Czechoslovakia, Judgment of Sept. 21, 1955, VG
Ansbach, No. 2070 11/55; for Poland, Judgment of June 18, 1959, VG Ansbach, No. 2100 11/59;
for Rumania, Judgment of May 1I, 1960, VG Ansbach, No. 5184 111/59; for Russia, Judgment
of Feb. 7, 1961, VG Ansbach, No. 2669 11/60; for Yugoslavia, Judgment of Nov. 22, 1960,
BayVerwGH, No. 88 VIII 60; for East Germany, Judgment of Aug. 4, 1957, VG Ansbach, No.
2744 11/56. But cf. Judgment of Sept. 27, 1960, BayVerwGH, No. 214 VIII 59 (Bayerischer
Verwaltungsgerichtshof Munich). The applicant left Greece after the accession of King Paul in
1947, which he contended was the event which caused his flight. The court, however, could perceive
no nexus between accession and flight, in that the accession made no "profound" change in the
government system of Greece.
3See e.g. Judgment of June 29, 1962, BVerwG, No. 41.60, in 40 INT'L L.R. 202. Here, the
plaintiff left Yugoslavia because he was being threatened by the government with a second term
of imprisonment unless he joined the Army. He would not join, because, as a Nazarene, military
service was abominable to him. For further cases illustrating this threat of government reprisal
and a listing of the various applicable situations, see generally I A. GRAHL - MADSEN, THE STATUS
OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 181-88 (1966).
"However, note Arzumanian, [1957] Francaise JCRR 92 Commission des Recours. (This court
is under the authority of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees). The court had no
trouble recognizing an Armenian fleeing from sporadic persecutions in Istanbul in 1955 as a
"refugee." Turkish persecution of Armenians has been occurring since the 15th century.
"In the Judgment of Nov. 20, 1958, VG Ansbach, No. 3009 11/57, the court stated "Der
ungarische Freiheitskampf 1956 liegt zwar zeitlich nach dem 1.1. 1951, ist aber eine Auswirkung
der kommunistischen Revolution in Ungarn vor dem 1.1. 1951. Er ist ein zu beachtender After
Effekt, der die Anwendung der G[enfer] K[onvention] nicht ausschliesst." ("It. is true that the
Hungarian War of Independence of 1956 is in point of time after January 1, 1951. However, it is
an after-effect of the communist revolution in Hungary before January 1, 1951. It is an after-effect
which has to be taken into consideration and which does not exclude the application of the Geneva
Convention.") See also Judgment of Apr. 28, 1959, BayVerwGH, No. 87 VIII 58. This rationale
has also been used in Austria. In Judgment of Nov. 20, 1957, [1958] JBI 364, in 24 INT'L L.R.
488 (1957), the Austrian Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's determination that the Hungarian
Uprising was directed against the Communist domination established in that country after World
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focusing upon the specific facts. It seems obvious that the refugee fled not
because of a well-founded fear of an individual reprisal, but because of the
general retaliations which he foresaw for the entire country. However, the
"event" which "caused" his flight was deemed to be the pre-1951 Communist
domination, not the 1956 Uprising. Surprisingly, however, when confronted
with a refugee from a non-communist colonial struggle, i.e. the Algerian Revo-
lution, that same court in its Judgment of February 8, 1961,6 summarily
dismissed the petition with minimal consideration of the possibility of an ac-
ceptable pre-1951 cause which resulted in the 1954 hostilities. 7 The precedent,
thus, would seem set: one fleeing "Iron Curtain Communism" is likely to be
declared a "refugee" within the terms of the Geneva Convention, while another
fleeing a non-communist regime, no matter how old or how harsh will find it
necessary to prove himself literally within the Convention's provisions.
War II, and therefore the petitioner, leaving after the Uprising, met the convention's definition of
"Refugee." It was an attempt to rid Hungary of that domination and should therefore be regarded
as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951. Furthermore, it would be inequitable to
treat Hungarians who fled Hungary in connection with this Uprising differently from persons who
left their home countries earlier for the reasons stated in the Convention.
"iln Judgment of Feb. 8, 1961, VG Ansbach, No. 5261 111/60, in 32 INT'L L.R. 230, the court
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claim for recognition as a "refugee" by the Federal Office for
the Recognition of Foreign Refugees which held that the beginning of hostilities in Algeria was
not an event occurring before January 1, 1951. "[Tlhe struggle of colonial and dependent peoples
for independence had existed virtually from time immemorial, and there was no date that could
be fixed for its commencement." 32 INT'L L.R., at 232. It should be noted that open large-scale
rebellion began in Algiers in 1954.
Cf. I A. GRAHL - MADSEN, supra note 43, at 170. "It cannot be doubted that certain war-time
and post-war events were foremost in the minds of the drafters of the Convention. Furthermore,
one may take it for granted that those colonial Powers which took part in the drafting of the
Convention did not consider themselves persecutors." But, he argues, that is not the decisive
rationale. The "real answer," he believes, is that there was a close connection, temporally as well
as politically, between the Soviet domination of Hungary and the later Uprising and mass exodus.
The French subjugation of Algeria occurred in 1830. For much of the time thereafter there was
political stability and tranquility. Furthermore, the Communist seizure of power had ". . . ipso
facto laid the foundation for subsequent persecution." He labels the French conquest of Algeria
as "wertneutral in the sense that it did not aim at revolutionizing civil society for ideological
reasons." Id.
But see T, MATrHEWS, WAR IN ALGERIA: BACKGROUND IN CRISIS 34 (1961). The author states
the view that the falsification of municipal elections by the local French government beginning in
1947 was the prime event which made the 1954 hostilities inevitable. But cf. E. O'BALANCE, THE
ALGERIAN INSURRECTION, 1954-62, at 34-35 (1967).
'"The underlying reasoning of the court is confusing. The court reluctantly concluded: "Bei der
Abfassung der G[enfer] K[onvention] war in erster Linie an die Unterwerfung vieler Staaten durch
den Kommunismus gedacht. Jedoch hat sich der objectivierte Wille der Vertragsparteien davon
gelost, so dass auch andere Ereignisse als die kommunistischen Unterjochungen in Simme der
G[enfer] K[onvention] verstanden werden miissen." ("During the drafting of the Geneva Conven-
tion the subjugation of many states by Communism was thought to be the primary consideration.
However, the intention of the parties to the treaty has in an objective way deviated from this, so
that also events other than communist subjugation must be understood in the sense of the Geneva
Convention.") Obviously the court was determined to base its decision within its interpretation of
the original intent of the Convention.
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The ultimate decision in the principal case turned on whether the appellant
met the Convention's definition of a refugee."' However, the first issue consid-
ered by the Court was whether the convention relied on by the appellant was
one that "is or has been acceded to by or on behalf of the Government of
Lesotho"-a determination which was required to invoke successfully the pro-
tection of the Aliens Control Act. 9 It was the appellant's contention that Prime
Minister Jonathan's letter to the United Nations50 had the effect of a general
accession to all applicable multilateral treaties, which therefore, included the
Convention in question.5 1 The respondent argued that the letter was no more
than a voluntary offer to observe certain treaties and conventions on a recipro-
cal basis.-2 Before considering the question of accession to the Convention, the
Court stated that since the appellant was relying on the specific terms of the
Convention and since the controlling provision of the Aliens Control Act 5 was
worded in terms of being "acceded to" it was not necessary to face the question
of succession to treaties by a new State . 5 The Court's effort to distinguish
between accession and succession appears tenuous due to the necessity of differ-
entiating between an accession within the context of the "clean slate" doctrine
and an assertion of the right of optional succession to treaties. Possibly, the
Court was attempting to avoid facing "head on" this controversial question by
circumventing the issue completely. However, subsequent to its statement, the
Court did decide the accession question based on an "examination and inter-
pretation of the letter itself." 55 As a result of its examination, the Court found
that the letter was a declaration that Lesotho would adhere to its predecessor's
multilateral treaties pending individual examination." The Court then, without
considering the full implication, equated the intention of temporary adherence
with an accession to the Convention and proceeded to consider the second
question. But, during the period of review of the predecessor's treaties, this
temporary adherence is in effect all that the Nyerere Doctrine accomplishes.
Following the specified review period, however, the advocates of this doctrine
contend that the new States may succeed to any of their predecessor's treaties
which they consider to be in their new national interests. It seems, then, that
one could say that the Court stumbled in attempting to sidestep the succession
'
8Supra note 6; Molefi, (P.C.), 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 886.
"Aliens Control Act, supra note 8; Molefi, (P.C.), 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 884.
IOSupra note 7.
SiMolefi, (P.C.), 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 884.





"... it becomes unnecessary to consider the various views which have been held by
international lawyers as to the circumstances under which there may be succession to





question by too readily equating temporary adherence with an accession. Since
the Jonathan letter was practically a verbatim copy of the Nyerere letter,57 it
seems highly plausible that at the time the letter was written it was the intention
of the government of Lesotho to follow the Nyerere approach to optional
succession rather than to indicate an intention to accede to the treaties as a
newly entering party.
Even though the Court disclaimed a consideration of the question of State
succession to treaties, the effect of its decision was to uphold the standard
declaration of the right to optional succession, i.e. the Nyerere letter. In essence
the Court approved the claim that "the successor state is free to determine
which treaties it wishes to continue and which it wishes to reject.", 8 This doc-
trine of optional succession has an obvious advantage for the new State and
some not so obvious disadvantages, both for the new State and international
harmony." The advantage lies in the usual desire of newly independent States
to repudiate as much as possible of their colonial hereditaments and to exercise
their newly acquired sovereign prerogative. The disadvantages relate primarily
to the disruption of the concept of international order. Optional succession
depends on the effect of a unilateral declaration; as a result, it can promote
controversy between States. Relying on the contractual nature of treaties, the
third parties may wish to exercise the same privilege to reconsider their obliga-
tions and to refuse to recognize treaties that were arranged with the predecessor
States. The termination of treaties at the option of new States has a direct
effect on the internal government of the other member States, as most interna-
tional conventions influence the internal government of their members. Also,
treaty registers are generally considered to be inaccurate; 0 and therefore, the
State's examination of existing treaties is likely to omit some pertinent agree-
ments. Under the Nyerere procedure, treaties not specifically affirmed by the
new State during the examination period are deemed to lapse. Failure to con-
sider every pertinent convention during that period, therefore, could conceiva-
bly result in the new State not being able to rely on an advantageous treaty.
Despite the disadvantages, it seems that optional succession is theoretically the
best approach to this problem. To avoid the practical difficulties, completely
accurate treaty registers would have to be developed. Relying on these, a new
State should be required to notify all third parties to applicable treaties made
by its predecessor of the new State's intention regarding each treaty.6' The third
5
'See notes 7, 35 and 37, supra.
112 D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17,
at 119.
"See generally id. at 120-21; Udokang, Succession to Treaties in New States, supra note 17, at
142-44.
"See Lawford, supra note 17, at 5.
"it is apparently the practice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to send a letter to
a new State listing the treaties and conventions which were applicable to its predecessor and
requesting that the new State indicate its intention regarding these agreements either to the deposi-
tary or the concerned individual States. U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/150 at 46 (1962).
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parties should then be allowed a like prerogative. Through.the above-outlined
system all affected treaties would be renegotiated and the problem of the
questionable applicability of the predecessor's treaties would be resolved. Dur-
ing the interim period of examination, all previous treaties should be adhered
to until specifically terminated or renegotiated.
From the time of Tanzania's assertion of the principle of optional succession
until Lesotho's independence, five new African States followed the Tanzanian
lead."2 The continuing reliance on devolution agreements reinforces the position
of this doctrine even though Professor O'Connell appears to consider them
non-mandatory."3 Also in strong support is the draft resolution of the Interna-
tional Law Association's Committee on Succession of New States to the Treat-
ies and Certain Other Obligations of their Predecessors," recognizing specifi-
cally the right of a new State to optional succession.
The Judicial Committee's second determination in the principal case that the
appellant was not competent to rely on the Convention in that he was not within
the Convention's definition of a refugee can possibly be perceived as tractable
to certain political complexities of the local situation. The Commonwealth
system has been weakened over the last decade, particularly in southern
Africa.65 Lesotho itself during the period of the principal case was politically
Lesotho, in fact, followed this notification procedure, at least with respect to agreements with
the United States. See Letter from the Lesotho Prime Minister to the American Charge d' Affaires
ad interim, October 4, 1966, [1966] 2 U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 6192. Lesotho herein indicated its desire
to continue in effect six specified agreements for a twelve month period from the date of independ-
ence. The United States concurred in this proposal.
On October 5, 1967 the American Embassy addressed a letter to the Ministry of External Affairs
of Lesotho querying if the effect of the Prime Minister's letter of March 22, 1967 (note 7 supra)
was to continue in force the agreements mentioned in the note of October 4, 1966 until October 4,
1968. The Ministry of External Affairs of Lesotho confirmed that this was the effect of the letter
[1967] 3 U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 6383.
"As of January 1, 1972, the continuance in force of this agreement was under negotiation
between the Government of the United States and the government of Lesotho." U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1972) at 150.
However, as an example of the difficulties inherent in the optional succession process, in a note
dated September 7, 1971, to the Secretary General of the U.N., the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Lesotho stated that it had not "been possible to evaluate all the treaties" within the time period
as originally established; therefore:
The Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, mindful of the desirability of the conti-
nuity of treaty relationships consistent with its independent status, and desirous of
continuing negotiations with the various States concerned in relation to the possible
continuation, modification or termination of such treaties, has decided that the period
during which it will apply, on a basis of reciprocity, the terms of such bilateral treaties
shall be extended without limit of time, pending the reaching of a satisfactory accord
with each State concerned.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1972) at 150.
"
2See note 36 supra.
"See note 32 supra.
541NT'L L. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE 53RD CONFERENCE, BUENOS AIRES 596-603 (1968).
'
5The Commonwealth's integrity was first challenged when South Africa removed itself in 1961.
Throughout the decade two of the members, India and Pakistan, have been continuously hostile
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divided and spotted by incidents which threatened to escalate into widespread
conflict. 6 Historically, 7 geographically, 8 and economically "9 Lesotho is sub-
stantially dependent on South Africa. It is doubtful, if the Judicial Committee
had reversed the Lesotho court, that Lesotho would have looked less to the
Commonwealth for support and guidance, although it is quite possible that
Lesotho might have sharply restricted the Judicial Committee's appellate juris-
diction.7" However, the refugees in Lesotho were a major problem for Jona-
than's government.7 ' The Molefi decision was a test case for at least forty other
refugees in that State. 72 If the appellant had been successful, would Lesotho
have abided by the decision; would the government have allowed the other forty
refugees to use the court system; would the Prime Minister have abided by a
decision which, in effect, would allow the numerous dissidents in South Africa
to envision Lesotho as a refuge from the Republic, i.e., the same dissidents who
are political allies with Jonathan's internal enemies? 7 How could Lesotho
assuage the South African government, seek its economic support, yet main-
tain within its own borders political refugees dedicated to the Republic's de-
struction? It is reasonable to infer that what the Judicial Committee called a
"fair minded approach ' 74 to this question of refugee definition contained within
its ambit certain consideration of these complexities?
The political question notwithstanding, the Court's application of the law
bears some criticism. The Committee dismissed petitioner's contention that the
Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960 was the after-effect of the 1948 National
Party victory in South Africa. 75 The Court decided that "the pre-1951 South
to each other. Cyprus has been unable to resolve her internal problems. Nigeria experienced the
Biafran War in the last half of the decade. Malaysia and Singapore have experienced increased
interfriction. The Southern Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence and the consequent
alliance with South Africa demonstrated the ineffective policies of the organization.
"See R. STEVENS, LESOTHO, BOTSWANA, and SWAZILAND (1967). Prime Minister, Chief Jona-
than, has been viewed as favoring increased relations between Lesotho and South Africa. Id. at
86-87, 94. Furthermore, the refugees had always presented a problem to Jonathan, internally as
well as externally. (Jonathan came into power in 1964). Refugees from South Africa would use
Lesotho as a base for terrorist activities in South Africa and, at the same time, try to strengthen
the more radical nationalist parties in Lesotho. Id. at 57, 94.
In January 1970, Lesotho's first national elections were declared invalid by Jonathan as it
became apparent that his party was about to lose. Time, Aug. 20, 1970, at 35.
7See generally A. HEPPLE, supra note I, at 257-58.
"Lesotho is an enclave, entirely surrounded by South Africa.
"A large proportion of Lesotho's work force finds employment across the border in South
Africa. POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD (R. Stebbins & A. Amoia ed. 1970) at
199.
70Lesotho, as all Commonwealth members, has the right to abridge or delete any Privy Council
influence within its judicial system. See note 13 supra.
7 See note 66 supra.
"Tihe Times (London), May 31, 1969, at 4, col. 6.
"See note 66 supra.
7
"Molefi, (P.C.), 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 888.
"Petitioner also contended that the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 was the event which
caused his flight.
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African legislation and the repressive government policy" were merely the
background to later events."
In 1948 the National Party took control of the government by defeating the
liberal United Party;" it then began its program of apartheid, a systematized
persecution 8 of Africans, more dehumanizing than any social Marxist pro-
gram. 9 Outlawing the Pan Africanist Congress was only one step in this pro-
gram, which was an after-effect of the 1948 election. 0 In affirming the High
Court's decision and supporting it, the Judicial Committee seems to be affirm-
ing its reasoning as well;"' this is unsatisfactory and discredits any policy deter-
7 0Molefi, (P.C.), 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 888. The quoted words are from appellant's petition.
"The defeat of the United Party is seen as a significant change of policy. See A. HEPPLE, supra
note I, at 149:
The defeat of Smuts, the war hero and world statesman, at the hands of the Nationalists
was much more significant than the defeat of Winston Churchill by the Labour Party
in the British elections of 1945. In Britain the contending parties had stood together in
fighting the war against the Nazis; in South Africa, the Nationalists had not only
opposed participation in the war but had hoped for a German victory. Throughout the
war they had done everything possible, short of sabotage, to hinder the government
78See A. HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 152-53. The period 1948-1953 was indicative of the future in
South Africa. The following steps were taken to familiarize the African people of South Africa
with the concepts of their new government;
a. The Population Registration Act (No. 30 of 1950) required the people to register and provide
all information necessary to classify each as "white," "Bantu," or "colored". A population register
was compiled and each person issued an identity card.
b. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (No. 5 of 1949) declared marriages between whites
and non-whites illegal. All mixed marriages entered into abroad by South Africans were declared
void.
c. The Immorality Amendment Act (No. 21 of 1950) prohibited sexual relations between
whites and non-whites.
d. Asiatic Laws Amendment Act (No. 47 of 1948) withdrew the voting rights given to the
Indians in 1946.
e. The Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act (No. 41 of 1949) denied unemployment
benefits to almost all Africans.
f. The Natives Representation Council, set up by Smuts, was abolished.
1. The Group Areas Act (No. 41 of 1950) established an initiating program for the effective
segregation of all races by removal and resettlement, the expropriation of property and the procla-
mation of reserved racial areas.
m. The Suppression of Communism Act (No. 44 of 1950). See note I supra.
"The courts in cases concerning refugees from Communism emphasize the drastic social-
political change and the resultant suffering by the refugee. An interesting illustration of the concept
is found in Judgment of Feb. 23, 1960, Bay Berw GH, No. 164 VIII 59. The refugee plaintiff
claimed flight because of government anti-semitism. The Court noted that this form of persecution
was not the result of events prior to 1951, as contemplated in the Convention, i.e. the Communist
take-over of Poland. Such persecution had been recurring in Poland since the Middle Ages.
From this it can be inferred that the accepted view is that persecution must have resulted from
a governmental change of drastic proportions.
"See A. HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 164-65 and note I supra for an explanation of the history of
the Unlawful Organizations Act and the PAC.
"The Committee specifically confirms the Lesotho High Court's rationale. Molefi, (P.C.), 9
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 888. The Lesotho High Court applied the torts' doctrine of proximate
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mination that might have been behind the reasoning of the Committee.
This decision does not portend a metamorphosis in the legal theory or politi-
cal practice of State Succession in the international arena, but it is noteworthy
in that it appears, despite the language of the Court, to be a judicial recognition
of the validity of the doctrine of optional succession to treaties. As such, the
case confirms that doctrine as an existing status of international political reality
and supports its position as customary international law.
Even though the Court's determination of the issue of the status of refugees
probably reflected prevalent international reality, it failed, however, to recon-
cile the Convention fully with the customary international commitment to the
ideal of individual human dignity. The change of government in South Africa
is no less significant than the creation of Israel"2 and Communist take-over of
territory. Each situation did occur before 1951 and did produce hardships on
certain groups of people living in those affected areas. Anyone fleeing a country
which underwent extreme political change, whose flight was caused by fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion, should be considered a refugee within the
cause in negligence cases in defining the relationship between cause and effect, using two remote
and undistinguished cases involved with proximate cause as precedents, H.M.S. London [1914] P.
72 and Smith, Hogg and Co. v. Black Sea and Baltic Gen. Ins. Co., [1940] A.C. 997. The High
Court stated:
Now I am prepared to assume that the words "as a result of events" in the Convention
do not require a direct and immediate causal connection between the events and the
result but that they, i.e. the words, should be construed to have been used in a somewhat
broad, practical sense, connoting causal relationship not necessarily as between the
result and the cause nearest to that result, but as between a result and a cause not too
remote from it or, to use the words of Sir Samuel Evans in H.M.S. London (L.R. 1914
P. 72 at p. 77), "sufficiently near for the Courts to give effect to it". Employing this
"empirical or common sense view of causation" (Lord Wright's words in Smith, Hogg
and Co. v. Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Co. [1940] A.C. at p. 1003) 1
consider that the enactment of the above piece of legislation by the South African
Parliament in 1950 (Act 44 of 1950) may have been a causa sine qua non of the charge
against him but that it was the charge itself, based on the applicant's activities long after
1951, which was the causa of his flight from South Africa.
(Emphasis, except case names and Latin words, added.) Molefi (High Court). 8 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'LS at 587.
The High Court's attempt to explain the causality relationship involved in the principal case by
analogizing it to the concept of proximate cause in torts is difficult to comprehend in any practical
application. Objectively, it would be no less difficult to find a causal thread between events in 1948
in South Africa and Molefi's flight into Basutoland than it would be to find such a thread between
the 1949 Communist power play in Hungary and an Hungarian Refugee's flight because of the
1956 fighting (see note 45, supra and accompanying text). The outlawing of the PAC and other
acts (see notes I and 16 supra) were no less the cause of Molefi's flight than the Hungarian Uprising
caused refugee flights after October 1956. Essentially these flights were both caused by radical
government changes occurring before 1951. See notes 77 and 78 supra concerning the South
African change.
"
2The Ansbach Court initially did not accord Palestinian refugees status under the Convention.
See Judgment of Jan. 17, 1961, VG Ansbach, No. 2377-79 11/59. However this decision was
overruled in Judgment of July 25, 1962, VG Ansbach, No. 5774-77 111/61.
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meaning of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, 1951. The case
is significant in that it is now recorded as an interpretation of the Convention,8 3




"But cf note 39 supra.
